

**Vietnamese War
And its impact on the course of US-Thai relations 1965-1966
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Abstract:

The Vietnam War had a wide impact on both countries, Thailand and the United States of America, since the arrival of American military advisors to Indochina in 1950. Armed conflicts occurred between what is known as the South Vietnam Front (the Viet Cong) consisting of the Communists and the Vietnamese, and the North Vietnamese forces supported by the United States of America, and escalated The pace of American intervention in 1960 during the era of US President John F. Kennedy, when the number of American forces intervening reached (16 thousand) American soldiers, and these numbers were increasing every year. In 1966, American forces began to gradually withdraw from Vietnam and end the American intervention, which is the stage known as (Vietnamization the war).

Keywords: Vietnam, War, US-Thai relations 1965-1966

The research
Introduction

The year 1965 witnessed clear developments in US-Thai relations, as the pace of military and non-military aid provided to Thailand increased, and in return, the United States of America obtained more cooperation from Thailand in its struggle against communist expansion in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. This military cooperation led to Economic cooperation in all fields, as Thailand has become the first ally of the United States.

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I Title

The Beginning of the Relationship

At the beginning of 1965, there was reassurance by the Thais that President Lyndon Johnson (Gray. 1997:168-171) was committed to the defense of Southeast Asia, and that the bombing operations that targeted North Vietnam in the wake of the Gulf of Tonkin incident (Lamia. 2004:129) would be renewed, just as the Thai leadership was pleased with the establishment of the United States. The United Nations stressed the importance of the role played by Thailand in supporting US military power in the region and increasing economic and military aid to Bangkok (G.Pegin. 1998:88). Thus, Thailand would have plunged itself into the circle of conflict in the region, as it sent in January of 1965 the Thai units to the war in Vietnam, and American planes were using Thai bases in the northeastern parts of Thailand to bomb sites in North Vietnam and Laos (Khmer.2006:45). It was expected that the improvement of US-Thai relations would be accompanied by a deterioration in Thailand's relations with its neighbors, and what was expected happened, as conflicts between Thailand and Cambodia were renewed (David.1991:192).

Thailand became a major target for security breaches after these events. Terrorist operations increased by some opposition movements that assassinated a number of officials in northeastern Thailand. These movements may be led by the Thai National Front (Arne. 1999:218), which led the communist media campaign against Thailand. This was the first rebellion in Thailand, which was supported by China. In order to study these conditions, a number of American and Thai officials met on January 26, 1965 to discuss developments in the situation in Thailand. During the meeting, the Thai government confirmed that it was able to control the situation (F.R.U.S.1965:286).

The policy of the Thai government has achieved great success and had positive results on relations with the United States after the decision it took to lift restrictions on American flights from Thai bases. Confirmed by the telegram sent by the US Embassy in Thailand to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 23, 1965 (The Encyclopedia Americana.1978:345).

American interest in Thailand increased after the warning by Mc Naught, the assistant to the Secretary of defense Robert McNamara (Mc Naughton.1965:481), that there were security breaches and a threat of war on the northeastern border of Thailand. He also recommended 400,000 US dollars for the purchase of military equipment (Moore.1965:290).

Both the US of State and Secretary of Defense supported what was stated in the McInton memorandum, explaining that increasing military aid to Thailand would give them evidence of our continued survival and our commitment to defending Thailand because they consider these rebellions in the northeastern part as a real threat to their country (F.R.U.S.1965: 293).

In order to discuss developments in the security situation in the northeastern parts of Thailand, Dawee Dawe, Commander of the Thai Air Force and Deputy Minister of Defense, went to Washington on May 18, 1965 and met with the US Secretary of Defense. During the meeting, Dawee explained that the Chinese-backed rebels had killed a number of government officials and collected money from people by force showing him that these areas are inhabited by 300 thousand people of Thais and Chinese. Dawi demanded the necessity of emphasizing economic development and increasing the amounts allocated for aid. For his part, McNamara confirmed that his government had sent mobile development units to help those villages. It had also installed 400 radio receivers (400 radio receivers). The two parties stressed the implementation of Project 22, which includes the construction of A military unit staffed by Thais but funded and equipped by the United States and based in the northeastern parts of Thailand to combat insurgency(F.R.U.S.1965: 293).

Bondi, the assistant to the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, supported the results of the agreement between Dawe and McNamara on Project (22) and the need to expedite its implementation. He explained through his letter to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, McKinnon, that the role of Prime Minister Thanom and Para vat, the Thai Interior Minister, is important to American foreign policy. He explained that at the same time, they are dominated by the character of the military spirit, so they are working to divert the state budget for economic development for military purposes, making financial aid insufficient for the purpose (Semaan.1967:64).

American public opinion escalated with Johnson's foreign policy, so he calmed the revolution of American public opinion by offering a negotiated settlement to the conflict on April 7, 1965 when he delivered a speech at Hopkins University in Baltimore, a city in the state of Maryland, in which he proposed several conditions for the settlement of the Vietnamese issue. Vietnam and other communist countries rejected these terms (R. Sean.1986:50) By July, there was a split in American public opinion about Vietnam, but Johnson made his decision and ordered the recruitment of

175,000 additional soldiers by the end of 1965. Thailand was delighted with President Johnson's escalation of the war and the increase in the number of American forces in the country because it found an opportunity to strengthen its relationship with Washington (Arne.1999:211). However, some Thai officials opposed the idea of increasing the number of US forces in the regions of northeastern Thailand and emphasized that the presence of these forces had a significant and clear impact on the population of the region and pointed to the disadvantages of rapid westernization, which resulted in a decline in moral standards and thus affected community relations, except that Thanom (ar.m.wikipedia.org) He ignored these objections and declared that Thailand was ready to send its military units to South Vietnam (F.R.U.S.1965: 299) The US ambassador referred to this issue and mentioned that Thai officials support the expansion of military efforts in Vietnam, which the United States welcomed very much and announced through its Defense Minister McNamara that it would provide additional aid and funds to Thailand in return for that (Sulak.1990:115).

Thanom was ready to risk everything in order to obtain more American aid, despite his great concern that he would appear involved in the conflict in Vietnam (Arne.1999:214). The question that comes to mind? Why did Thanom make his unexpected offer about using Thai troops in the Vietnam War? The matter was not clear at the time, as Washington itself did not submit such a request to Thailand.

II. Title

Reason

Reason

And to find out the reasons that prompted Thanom to make his offer, this is his realization that Thailand, without American aid, will not be able to stand up to the threats directed against it by North Vietnam and China. But more than that, it shows Thailand, without that aid, will not be able to combat even the internal rebellion in it, as its naval and air forces do not have the capabilities and capabilities that enable it to be self-reliant. Moreover the Thai border police and Thai paratrooper's reconnaissance units also receive full support from the CIA (F.R.U.S.1965: 303).

What the Thai government feared happened, as China invaded the northeastern regions of Thailand on September 10, 1965, and they worked to stir up poor minorities there (Arne.1999:151). In a statement with uncalculated consequences, Thanat Khoman (ar.m.wikipedia.org) told the

Thai press that he preferred to bomb Hanoi and that he had told the Americans about this matter. These statements ignited the media and increased the frequency of rumors about Thailand's involvement with the Americans in hostilities, despite the instructions issued by the US embassy, through denying these rumors for fear of the possible reaction that China and North Vietnam would show (Arne.1999:151). The issue of the Chinese invasion of the northeastern regions of Thailand was a source of concern for the Thai military forces, which in turn criticized the US military aid. Kerdpol attacked Washington in his statements because it treats Thailand as a beggar and not as a friend, adding that the Thais are not children, but rather they need real help (R. sean.1981:118).

In a move not without political shrewdness, China took advantage of these defections in the positions of Thai officials towards the United States. Its foreign minister, Chen Yi, told the French ambassador that communism would prevail in South Vietnam, even if the departure of American forces from there was delayed, and declared with confidence, "Within a year, we will witness There was a war in Thailand". During 1965, the path of the communist movement shifted from a defensive state to an offensive one. There were more than 30 offensive operations against government headquarters. The Thai government responded to that by bombing questionable areas. It also began a series of economic development programs in remote areas of the northeast Thailand (F.R.U.S.1965: 304).

The American political circles suggested that China's plan aims to inflame the situation and increase defections and rebellions in Indochina with the presence of American forces there. The northeastern parts of Thailand were part of this plan. Those events were accompanied by some internal developments in Thailand. It began writing its new constitution and is preparing for the elections to be held. In the middle of 1968, therefore, the Thai government was in need of funds. Ambassador Martin confirmed through the memorandum he sent to Richard Stewart.

The Deputy Director of Coordination in the Office of the Director stressed the need to support the Thai elections and provide funds so that they avoid offers made by Chinese merchants in Bangkok (Marshall.2007:676).

In preparation for that, Ambassador Martin prepared a detailed report on political parties and presented it to the so-called 303 committee responsible for financing elections in Thailand. During the report, Martin confirmed that Thailand is under military rule and there are no political parties opposed to the government except for the party of former Prime Minister Kohang Afungs

and the Thai Communist Party, which is considered An illegal party, but the number of its supporters and sympathizers increased, especially among young people and intellectuals, during that period (F.R.U.S.1965: 305).

It was also stated in the report submitted by Ambassador Martin that the United States will support the ruling party in Thailand to win the elections and stressed that there are a number of risks facing the states for adopting financing the electoral campaign in Thailand, and the first of these risks are (F.R.U.S.1966: 309):-

- 1-It gave an opportunity to the communists to exploit in their propaganda.
- 2-That this money will be used for personal interests by Thai officials.

The Thai government feared the deterioration of the situation in the northeastern regions, so it hastened to submit an urgent request to the American Embassy on February 15, 1966 to provide them with 12 helicopters, 30 warships equipped with equipment, 20 small warplanes and a number of modern guns. Within the framework of diplomatic moves as a result of the increasing communist threat to Thailand, the Thai King and Prime Minister Thanom went to Pakistan and met with the American ambassador there and expressed his great concern about the situation in his country and appealed to the Pakistani ambassador to pressure his country to provide Thailand with all the assistance it needs (F.R.U.S.1966: 310).

This visit had positive results in expediting the dispatch of aid to Thailand. Chester Cooper, National Security Council Adviser, went to Bangkok on February 28, 1966. The visit lasted for three days, during which he met with Thai officials and wrote a detailed report on Thailand's needs, which he sent to the Special Committee formed to combat the insurgency. In the report, the great Thai cooperation is of great importance to the Americans in Southeast Asia, and that the weakest link in the chain of the Thai government is the police institutions in the provinces. The Vietnamese in this area also stressed the need to establish a counter-insurgency center in Bangkok (F.R.U.S.1966: 312).

As a continuation of the procedures followed by the United States regarding what is happening in Thailand, Ambassador Martin told Prime Minister Thanom that the United States was not convinced with the performance of the Royal Thai Air Force and the need to replace its commander and make some improvements in its performance. The ambassador also put forward the idea of borrowing American equipment and aircraft in Vietnam instead of bringing them From the United States in short time (B. Teplinsky.1968:41-42).

The fighting intensified in the middle of 1966 in Vietnam, as 4,000

warplanes participated, including 2,200 combat aircraft and 1,800 helicopters, and it carried out 800 sorties, concentrated on the southern region that extends along the border between Thailand and Laos, which raised fears of Bundy, Special Assistant for Far Eastern Affairs, so he sent a letter to the minister Rusk urged him to expedite the need to take the necessary measures because the collapse of the situation in Vietnam means transferring the conflict to Thailand, which will push Thailand to conclude peace with China, and thus the situation of the United States will be critical in Southeast Asia, so he presented a proposal to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which he stated (Alexeyev. , 1988 : 124):-

- 1-The need to intensify military operations against Vietnam from Thai territory.
- 2-Strengthening the Thai government with regard to its counterinsurgency programs.
- 3-To prepare Thailand for war by training its military forces well.
- 4-Expedite the recruitment of military forces and increase military support for Thailand.

The United States began working to intensify its efforts in the East Asian region after the developments of the Vietnam War. It proceeded to unify the regimes loyal to it to activate its struggle against communism, so it formed Asia Pacific Science and Technology Centers AspAc (Alexeyev. , 1988 : 123) and declared that its official goal is to support fruitful cooperation for participating countries in all fields, including social, economic and cultural. Regional centers have been established within the countries participating in the organization. The center of this organization in Bangkok was specialized in coordinating economic cooperation between the countries belonging to the organization. Its first conference was on June 14, 1966 in Seoul, the capital of South Korea, where it took 14 hours. June 16, and Thailand was one of the participating countries (Omero.2011:69).

US aid to Thailand was not limited to the military aspect, but also included the economic aspect. The value of agricultural exports to Thailand rose from 8.3 million dollars during 1958 to 38 million dollars during 1966. American exporters also had the largest share in importing Thai wheat in exchange for powdered milk. This period is an example of economic development supported by Washington in Southeast Asia and the main base for all secret operations launched by the United States throughout Indochina(F.R.U.S.1966: 314).

The United States also intensified its efforts to assist the Thai government

in eliminating the rebellion in the northeastern regions of the country. When the SEATO meeting was held for the period June 27-29 in Canberra, Australia, the focus of the meeting revolved around the situation in northeastern Thailand. Thanat expressed his fears that the use of Thai forces in a manner Explicit in Vietnam would give an excuse for North Vietnam to send its troops to South Vietnam through Laotian territory. During the meeting of the second day at the Siyato conference, Thanat demanded that the officials present at the meeting need to hold the legal Sofa agreement, which pertains to the status of the US armed forces in Thailand, which the United States had previously signed with Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan. His demand came after the increase in the military forces in Thailand. And after the questions raised by Thai officials about the duration of the stay of these 124 thousand American forces (F.R.U.S.1966: 318).

The pace of events accelerated in Thailand during the months of July and August of 1966, so the dissidents present in northeastern Thailand began bombing a number of areas adjacent to the American military bases in Takali, Ubon, Udon, and Korat. He told him that Thailand is able to control the situation in the northeastern part, which prompted the latter to send a telegram to Defense Minister McNamara confirming that Thanat is one of the distinguished Thai personalities who supported the positions of the United States. He also enjoys wide popularity in American circles, so he must be rewarded in recognition of his role (Arne.2000:264).

Members of Congress criticized US President Johnson that his foreign policy did not achieve the desired results, so Congressman Mansfield planned an official investigation by the Foreign Relations Committee in the US Senate that includes giving clarifications about US-Thai relations and what are President Johnson's plans for the future in that region, stressing that The United States is providing assistance to Thailand without benefit, and the position of Congress was clearly demonstrated during the twenty-first session of the United Nations, where Fulbright touched on the necessity of evaluating US-Thai relations, and stressed during his meeting with Thai officials that the commitments of the United States will lead Thailand to become another Vietnam, and he stressed, saying: " The situation in Southeast Asia does not deserve the life of a single American soldier being threatened because of it, and the Johnson administration is trying to avoid the American people's questions that close relations with Thailand are not worth the sacrifice unless Thailand is an American colony" (Micheal.2014:13).

This statement aroused the dissatisfaction of Thai officials, especially

since the senator enjoys wide fame and prestige because of his sponsorship of the American scholarship program, as well as his chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee. A bilateral agreement with the Philippines and prioritizing its relations with them on the basis of regional security did not do so with Thailand (Corrine.184:78-79).

Thanat responded to Fulbright's comments, saying: "The Thais prefer to fight communism themselves rather than be a pawn in the hands of Senator Fulbright. We are not the fifty-first state of the United States." Thanat also accused him of being unqualified to stand as a real hero to contribute to a more colorful democratic parliament than him, and that there are Many people of color are currently disenfranchised and in the same state as the senator (F.R.U.S.1966: 329).

And in light of the statements made by Fulbright and others with him, the Thais insisted on the need to crystallize relations in the form of a bilateral treaty between them and the United States. Aid was allocated to India and Pakistan (David.1972:166).

In light of the United States' efforts to satisfy the Thai government, in October, the United States asked the CIA to write a report on the reasons for the delay in the judiciary.

CONCLUSION

1-Thailand will be an example to follow in the development and fight against communism in Southeast Asia, due to the large amount of economic aid flowing to it.

2-Or is Thailand's relationship with the United States in the sixties important for understanding the regional dimensions of the conflict in Vietnam? This thesis shows the reader that the Thai military contribution to the Vietnam War would not have been without the great pressure exerted by Washington at times and the temptations they offered to Bangkok at other times, but the Thais They were not just mercenaries, but they had a huge role in stopping the spread of communism in Southeast Asia, and their motives stemmed from considerations related to national security that they believed in, and not just the pursuit of American money, as they played an ideal role, whether political or military, for Washington in Southeast Asia In the fifties and sixties, it was the direct starting point for the American forces in this fighting.

3-During the years and that followed, Bangkok's main concern was to obtain a bilateral agreement with the United States, but the US administration

did not encourage such an agreement because they did not wish to increase the US foreign military commitments in Southeast Asia.

4 -The United States obtained an invaluable ally in Southeast Asia and a base from which it launched in all its operations and wars in Indochina. While the United States lost, it helped prevent a complete collapse of the region under the weight of communist expansion.

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26. <http://ar.m.wikipedia.org> .Thanat Koman: He was born in 1914 in Bangkok, and he comes from an educated family. His father was a judge in Thailand. He received a scholarship, so he went to France and studied at the Institute of Political Science. After his return to Thailand, he opposed his country's policy of cooperating with Japan and joined the Free Thailand Movement, which opposes the government. He worked A number of diplomatic positions. In 1952 he assumed the position of Chairman of the Economic Commission of the United Nations in New York, and then the position of Deputy Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations in 1957, then the Ambassador of Thailand to the United States, and in 1959 he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. 1961, after which he held the position of head of the Democratic Party in 1979. He retired from diplomatic life in 1982, died in 2016.

الحرب الفيتنامية

وتأثيرها على سير العلاقات الأمريكية التايلندية 1965 – 1966

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الملخص :

كانت حرب فيتنام ذات تأثير واسع على كلا البلدين تايلند والولايات المتحدة الامريكية منذ ان وصل المستشارون العسكريون الامريكيون الى الهند الصينية عام 1950 حدثت صراعات مسلحة بين مايعرف بجبهة فيتنام الجنوبية (الفيت كونغ) المكونة من الشيوعيين والفيتناميين وبين قوات الشمال الفيتنامية التي تساندها الولايات المتحدة الامريكية ,وتصاعدت وتيرة التدخل الامريكي في عام 1960 اثناء عهد الرئيس الامريكي جون كينيدي حيث وصل عدد القوات الامريكية المتدخلة الى (16 الف) جندي امريكي وكانت هذه الاعداد تتزايد كل عام وفي عام 1966 بدأت القوات الامريكية بالانسحاب التدريجي من فيتنام وانهاء التدخل الامريكي وهي المرحلة التي عرفت باسم (فتنمة الحرب) .
الكلمات المفتاحية: فيتنام ، حرب ، العلاقات الامريكية ، 1965-1966.